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Situating Sarnia: “Unimagined Communities”
in the New National Energy Debate
Dayna Nadine Scott*
This paper argues that the active “unimagining” of downstream communities
is crucial to maintaining a notion of unitary national ascent in the rhetoric sur-
rounding the articulation of a new national energy strategy, specifically in relation
to the pipeline debates that have gripped and divided Canadians. The exclusion of
these unimagined communities downstream is demonstrated by situating Sarnia,
Ontario — home to Canada’s biggest petro-chemical complex — both legally and
spatially. Examining in detail the recent decision of the National Energy Board
approving Enbridge’s application to reverse the flow of oil over a portion of its
“Line 9” pipeline between Sarnia and Montreal reveals that the people of the Aam-
jiwnaang First Nation, downstream of Sarnia’s refineries, need to be actively
unimagined if the narrative of a “coast-to-coast” pipeline that will benefit every-
one is to be maintained. Strategies for imaginative displacement are explored in the
National Energy Board’s consideration of the Line 9 application, in relation to the
claims of the Aamjiwnaang First Nation, the renouncing of the Board’s process by
Haudenosaunee activists, and in the campaign of prior rhetorical de-legitimation
of opposition to pipelines carried out by the federal cabinet. The act of “situating”
Sarnia — bringing into view the crucial spatial aspects of the legal and regulatory
dynamic — demonstrates the distributional consequences of the pipeline decisions
currently being contemplated. In paying attention to the everyday, chronic pollu-
tion that inevitably comes with the refining of dirty oil (completely separate from
the greenhouse gas emissions tied to the extraction of tar sands crude), we can see
that the costs and risks associated with these decisions are delivered as inequities
* Dayna Nadine Scott is an Associate Professor at Osgoode Hall Law School and the
Faculty of Environmental Studies, York University. She teaches administrative law,
environmental law, and justice and risk regulation. Her research has focused on the
regulation of pollution, the governance of toxic substances, gender and environmental
heath and feminist theory of the body. She is currently the Director of the National
Network on Environments and Women’s Health. The author would like to thank an
anonymous reviewer for very productive suggestions for the development of the
analysis around “active unimagining” that led to a significant re-articulation of the
argument. I am indebted to the participants of the JELP meeting in the summer of
2012; and to the group of committed scholars at the Carleton University Department of
Law and Legal Studies who attended my Chet Mitchell lecture on the topic of
“Situating Sarnia” in March 2012. Amar Bhatia, Albert Koehl, Adrian Smith, Sarah
Wiebe and Anna Zalik provided helpful feedback. My friends and colleagues from the
Aamjiwnaang First Nation provided the real stimulus for the argument presented here.
Excellent research assistance was provided by Sarah Lewis, a recent MES grad from
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to the communities at the ends of the pipelines.
Dans cet article, l’auteure fait valoir qu’il est essentiel de pratiquer
l’aveuglement volontaire à l’égard des communautés vivant en aval de cours d’eau
pour obtenir un consensus national dans le cadre des discussions sur la mise en
place d’une nouvelle politique énergétique nationale, particulièrement dans le
cadre des discussions qui ont préoccupé et divisé les Canadiens à propos de
l’utilisation de pipelines. La ville de Sarnia, en Ontario, où se trouve le plus impor-
tant complexe pétrochimique au Canada, illustre, sur le plan juridique et gé-
ographique, l’exclusion de ces communautés ignorées. Une lecture attentive de la
récente décision de l’Office national de l’énergie ayant accueilli la demande dé-
posée par Enbridge pour faire inverser le sens dans lequel s’écoule le pétrole dans
un tronçon de sa « ligne 9 » entre Sarnia et Montréal révèle que l’on ne peut
accepter le projet de la mise en place d’un pipeline d’un océan à l’autre au béné-
fice de tous que si l’on ignore volontairement les membres de la Première nation
Aamjiwnaang, lesquels vivent en aval des usines de raffinage de Sarnia. Des solu-
tions de rechange créatives sont explorées par l’Office national de l’énergie dans
son étude de la demande concernant la ligne 9, tenant compte des arguments
avancés par la Première nation Aamjiwnaang, du refus des militants iroquois de
participer aux procédures de l’Office et des campagnes de sensibilisation du cabi-
net fédéral visant à écarter à l’avance toute légitimité au mouvement d’opposition
aux pipelines. Le cas de Sarnia, qui permet de mettre en lumière les aspects gé-
ographiques fondamentaux de la dynamique juridique et réglementaire, démontre
les diverses conséquences des décisions sur le point d’être rendues à l’égard des
pipelines. En pointant du doigt la pollution chronique quotidienne qui accompagne
inévitablement le raffinage du pétrole (laquelle pollution est complètement distincte
des émissions de gaz à effet de serre associées à l’extraction du pétrole brut des
sables bitumineux), nous pouvons constater que les communautés qui se trouvent
aux extrémités des pipelines sont exposées de manière injuste aux coûts et aux dan-
gers qu’entraı̂nent ces décisions.
In an inversion of Benedict Anderson’s influential idea of imagined communi-
ties, eco-critic Rob Nixon recently argued that the idea of the modern nation-state
is actually sustained by producing unimagined communities — and not only be-
yond the national boundaries, but within.1 These are the communities, according to
Nixon, “whose vigorously unimagined condition becomes indispensable to main-
taining a highly selective discourse of national development”.2 I argue in this paper
that this active unimagining has been prominently employed in the recent pipeline
debates that have gripped and divided Canadians.
1 Rob Nixon, “Unimagined Communities: Megadams, Monumental Modernity, and De-
velopmental Refugees” in Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor
(Harvard University Press, 2011) at 150.
2 Ibid.
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The Harper government’s stated goal is that of “responsible resource develop-
ment”; a key element of the vision is developing Canada into an “energy super-
power” by ramping up extraction activities in Alberta’s contested tar sands region.3
But the singular aim of “development” that is implied in the calls for a new national
energy strategy hides from view all of the communities downstream of both the
extractive sites and the facilities refining tar sands crude. Their inclusion would in
fact disrupt the implied trajectory — it is not “development” in the sense of a uni-
tary national ascent, in which everyone would benefit, but rather a situation in
which some benefit, while others suffer devastating losses — to land, culture, live-
lihoods and health. The exclusion of these unimagined communities downstream is
demonstrated in this paper by situating Sarnia, Ontario — home to Canada’s big-
gest petro-chemical complex — both legally and spatially. By examining in detail
the recent decision of the National Energy Board (NEB) approving Enbridge’s ap-
plication to reverse the flow of oil over a portion of its “Line 9” pipeline between
Sarnia and Montreal, it becomes obvious that the people of the Aamjiwnaang First
Nation, downstream of Sarnia’s refineries, need to be actively unimagined for the
narrative of a unitary national ascent to be maintained.
The act of “situating” Sarnia — bringing into view the crucial spatial aspects
of the legal and regulatory dynamic — demonstrates the distributional conse-
quences of the pipeline decisions currently being contemplated. In paying attention
to the everyday, chronic pollution that inevitably comes with the refining of dirty
oil (completely separate from the greenhouse gas emissions tied to the extraction of
tar sands crude), we can see that the costs and risks associated with these decisions
are delivered as inequities to the communities at the ends of the pipelines.
The analysis consists of three parts. Part I introduces the contemporary de-
bates around the national energy strategy and reveals how the pipeline proposals
currently on the table raise critical environmental justice considerations. Part II sit-
uates Sarnia in the national energy picture, spatially, and on the legal landscape by
briefly mapping out the problems with the regulation of air pollution there. Part III
returns to the theme of unimagined communities by demonstrating that the ability
to maintain the tar sands as an icon of national ascent requires the descending pros-
pects of communities whose basic ecology is tied to the land, air, and water being
impacted by their expansion. Strategies for imaginative displacement are explored
in the NEB’s consideration of Enbridge’s Line 9 Reversal application, in relation to
the claims of the Aamjiwnaang First Nation, and in the campaign of prior rhetorical
de-legitimation of opposition to pipelines carried out by the federal cabinet. The
overall aim is to expose the distributive consequences of the contested pipeline de-
cisions central to the implementation of a new national energy strategy — conse-
quences that are obscured by the rhetoric of development in the Canadian public
interest.
3 For examples of the “energy superpower” rhetoric and the calls for a new national
energy strategy, see Eric Reguly, “North America back in saddle as black gold super-
power”, (19 November 2011), online: The Globe and Mail Report on Business
<http://www.theglobeandmail.com>; Shawn McCarthy, “National energy strategy
gains clout”, (10 July 2011), online: The Globe and Mail Report on Business
<http://www.theglobeandmail.com>.
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1. PART I: PIPELINES DELIVER INEQUITIES
. . . our aspirations will ultimately be realized in steel.
Alberta Premier Alison Redford4
Today, we witness the marked visibility of pipelines in North America. They
have featured in front page news stories, both in Canada and in the U.S., for well
over a year. They have achieved almost the status of “high politics” in the relation-
ship between Canada and the U.S.5 In fact, they apparently involve such high
stakes that President Obama judged it to be impossible to make a clear call on the
Keystone XL in advance of the recent presidential election,6 and Prime Minister
Harper could not seem to allow the hearings of an independent, arms-length admin-
istrative panel to proceed with its work on the environmental assessment of the
Northern Gateway proposal without pre-empting judgment on the key question of
“national interest”.7 In the 2012 federal budget, the Harper Conservatives put pipe-
lines front-and-center, introducing dramatic changes to the environmental assess-
ment regime in Canada in order to shorten the timeframes by which big energy
projects can be approved.8 So pipelines, for now, are front page news — they are
everywhere around us. But once a pipeline is completed, it literally vanishes under-
ground. Once buried, the critical social relationships and power mechanisms that
are scripted in and enacted through its flows become blurred.9 A purpose of this
paper is to put them onto the agenda as we move forward with consequential, dura-
ble infrastructure choices in pursuit of “national development”.
Energy infrastructure decisions, such as those to build pipelines, create com-
plex systems of interconnection and exchange amongst natural, social, economic
and built environments.10 At the same time, the pipeline is a fixed, durable physical
structure that determines the routes of resource flows over time. It creates path de-
4 Alison Redford verbatim: “We rise together or we fall together” — excerpt from a
speech to the Economic Club of Canada, Toronto, on November 16, 2011, Policy Op-
tions: Sustainable Energy, February 2012, vol 33, no 02 at 8.
5 To follow the saga, see the reporting in the Globe and Mail, in particular: Nathan
Vanderklippe, Shawn McCarthy, Campbell Clark and Eric Reguly. Online: The Globe
and Mail <http://www.theglobeandmail.com>.
6 Shawn McCarthy & Nathan Vanderklippe, “To Harper’s ‘profound disappointment,’
Obama rejects Keystone”, (18 January 2012), online: The Globe and Mail
<http://www.theglobeandmail.com>.
7 Shawn McCarthy & Steven Case, “For the Harper government, the Gateway must be
open”, (9 January 2012), online: The Globe and Mail
<http://www.theglobeandmail.com>.
8 Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012, SC 2012, c. 19, s. 27(2) as amended
by Jobs, Growth and Long-Term Prosperity Act, SC 2012, c. 19, s. 52.
9 This is a critical insight emanating from the literature on “networked infrastructures”.
For a powerful example, see Maria Kaika, “Landscapes of energy: Hydropower from
Techno-Natures to Retro-Natures (Manchester eScholar — The University of
Manchester)” (2009) 2 Harvard New Geographies 103.
10 Roger Keil & Douglas Young, “In-Between Canada: The Emergence of the New Ur-
ban Middle” in In-Between Infrastructure: Urban Connectivity in an Age of Vulnera-
bility (Praxis (e)Press, 2011) 1.
SITUATING SARNIA   85
pendence in a literal sense.11 As David Harvey notes, natural resource economies
can tend to develop a “spatial fix” because of the inflexibility of the invested capi-
tal.12 This is exacerbated as further resources are sunk into technologies of extrac-
tion and export.13 The interests favoured by the choice of a pipeline’s route also
drive the socio-economics, institutions and structures that regulate resource
flows.14 Of course, the principles by which we have regulated these flows them-
selves are changing over time, and in Canada have been influenced by privatiza-
tion, deregulation and commercialization trends over the past three decades.15
It is not just crude oil, or diluted bitumen, that flows along a pipeline’s route.
Air pollution tags along too, and it is emitted at the point we choose to locate the
refineries. Typical environmental health effects for communities downstream of re-
fineries include elevated rates of leukemia and other cancers, asthma and respira-
tory illness and reproductive disorders.16 The choice of the pipeline’s route, then,
11 Jochen Monstadt, “Conceptualizing the political ecology of urban infrastructures: in-
sights from technology and urban studies” (2009) 41 Pion Journals, Environment and
Planning A 1924 at 1928. There is no “tabula rasa upon which new infrastructure sys-
tems can be freely constructed.” Rather, they are subject to a high inertia. Susan Leigh-
Star, “The Ethnography of Infrastructure” (1999) 43:3 American Behavioral Scientist
377 at 382.
12 David Harvey, The Limits to Capital, 2nd ed. (United States: Verso Press, 2000). Simi-
larly, as Anna Zalik notes, the “technology-intensive industrial enclave” that surrounds
“the mining of hydrocarbon-derived energy” renders it “stuck in place” (Zalik, Protest-
as-Violence in Oil Fields: The Contested Representation of Profiteering in Two Extrac-
tive Sites” in S Feldman, C Geisler & G Menon, eds, “Accumulating Insecurity: Vio-
lence and Dispossession in the Making of Everyday Life,” University of Georgia Press,
2011, 261–284 at 263).
13 Harris Ali, “The Political Economy of Environmental Inequity” in Speaking for Our-
selves: Environmental Justice in Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2009) 97 at 98. As
Ali notes, the pioneering work on the Canadian political economy was done by Harold
Innis, who developed the “staples theory” through which generations of Canadians
came to understand our role as the “hewers of wood and drawers of water.” Harold
Adams Innis, The cod fisheries: the history of an international economy (Toronto: Uni-
versity of Toronto Press, 1954). David McNally’s critique complicated the picture by
revealing how Innis’ staples theory treats commodities as if they are “simple things”,
rather than reflections of relations between people. McNally, “Staple Theory as Com-
modity Fetishism: Marx, Innis and Canadian Political Economy” (1981) Studies in Po-
litical Economy 35–63.
14 Monstadt, supra note 11 at 1934.
15 G Bruce Doern, “Canadian Energy Policy and the Struggle for Sustainable Develop-
ment: Political-Economic Context” in Canadian Energy Policy and the Struggle for
Sustainable Development (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005) 3. Monstadt
questions whether these trends have produced a new opacity in infrastructure markets,
as governance increasingly takes place at international and supranational scales. Mon-
stadt, supra note 11 at 1938. See also Alastair Lucas, “The New Environmental Law”
in Environmental Law and Policy, 3d ed. (Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publications,
2003) 163.
16 These downstream communities are often referred to as “fenceline communities.” For
more, see a recent series of reports on the health risks in these communities at “Chemi-
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carries distributive consequences. What we need to consider is how particular local
burdens can be understood to flow from “specific constellations of power relations”
on a broader scale.17
The distribution of benefits and risks relating to the environment are the key
preoccupations of the environmental justice movement.18 The movement organizes
itself around the notion of disproportionate burdens — “the claim that while pollu-
tion is everywhere, it is most easily found in a few choice places, particularly those
inhabited by the poor, the racialized, and the marginalized.”19 Most strikingly, in
Canada, is the extent to which environmental inequities plague aboriginal commu-
nities.20 In interrogating systemic questions of power and ownership relating to
who profits from and exerts exploitative control over ecological resources, eco-
nomic capital and social labour, the environmental justice lens also takes account of
how these exploitative relationships shape peoples’ everyday physical realities.21
Thus the fundamental starting point of an environmental justice perspective on the
contemporary pipeline debates is to ask why some people and communities are
expected, in the context of a national energy strategy, to endure higher degrees of
risk than others.
2. PART II: PLACING SARNIA IN THE NATIONAL ENERGY
PICTURE
The city of Sarnia, Ontario, has not featured centrally in the mainstream de-
bate about the various pipeline proposals under consideration in North America.
And yet, from a Canadian perspective, as I will demonstrate in this section, Sarnia
cal Contamination in Fenceline Communities”, (June 2012), online: The Collaborative
on Health and the Environment <http://www.healthandenvironment.org/fenceline>.
17 Kate Parizeau, “Theorizing Environmental Justice: Environment as a Social Determi-
nant of Health” in Munk Centre for International Centre Briefings, Comparative Pro-
gram on Health and Society Lupina Foundation Working Papers Series (Toronto: Uni-
versity of Toronto, 2006) 101. In a way, this is similar to the method that Timothy
Mitchell lays out in Carbon Democracy: he advocates for following the “oil itself”, its
material qualities and its particular locations of extraction and refining, because in trac-
ing those connections, we discover “how a peculiar set of relations was engineered
among oil, violence, finance, expertise and democracy” (Mitchell, “Carbon Democ-
racy” (2009) 38(3) Economy and Society 399–432 at 422).
18 This is true notwithstanding the call by critical scholars recently to expand the environ-
mental justice lens to accommodate issues of recognition and procedure, as well as
distribution. See for example, Gordon Walker, “Beyond Distribution and Proximity:
Exploring the Multiple Spatialities of Environmental Justice” (2009) 41:4 Antipode
614–636.
19 Dayna Nadine Scott, “Confronting Chronic Pollution: A Socio-Legal Analysis of Risk
and Precaution” (2008) 46 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 293 at 296.
20 Julian Agyeman, Peter Cole & Randolph Haluza-DeLay, eds, “Introduction” in Speak-
ing for Ourselves: Environmental Justice in Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2009) at
12.
21 Andil Gosine & Cheryl Teelucksingh, Environmental Justice and Racism in Canada:
An Introduction (Emond Montgomery Publications, 2008).
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is in fact a key infrastructural hinge in the national energy narrative that is
emerging.22
Sarnia’s place in the national energy picture was secured early, with the dis-
covery of oil in Lambton County, Ontario, in the 1950s, marked today by the en-
during presence of a little village called Petrolia.23 That discovery led to the devel-
opment of a deep water port at Sarnia, bordering Michigan, the first node in a
system of connections that came to include a tunnel under the St. Clair River24 and
the Bluewater Bridge, now a major border crossing route for truck traffic between
Canada and the U.S.25 The petrochemical industry followed not long after, en-
couraged by the favourable geologic formations in the area that allow for the stor-
age of liquids and gases underground,26 and fueled by the synergies in materials
and wastes that make facilities for the refining of oil and the production of petro-
chemicals “good neighbors”.27
Enbridge built the first major piece of Canadian oil infrastructure.28 The Inter-
provincial Pipeline was built in the 1950s to transport crude oil from Edmonton
east towards Sarnia, and in 1976, it was extended to Montreal.29 Today, this system
22 This is made visually obvious by the examination of several maps that are now circu-
lating of the crude oil pipeline networks of North America. As an example, see the
interactive graphic by the CBC, Canada’s Main Pipeline Network,
<http://www.cbc.ca/news/interactives/map-pipeline/>.
23 JH Fairbank, Petrolia Canada: 1908 (R Stirrett Co, 1909). As Christina Burr (“Oil
Mania”: Colonial Land Policy, Land Speculation, and Settlement in Enniskillen Town-
ship, 1830s–1860s, Social History 267–306) notes, colonial officials at the time of oil’s
discovery (1850s) “sought to create a terrain for capital accumulation through dispos-
session of Native peoples”, land tenure rules, and property registration (at 268). In En-
niskillen township, just southeast of Sarnia, this process was “uniquely shaped” by the
presence of oil.
24 The discovery of oil in Petrolia started talk of a tunnel under the St Clair River —
eventually the world’s first subaqueous tunnel — but thirty-five more years were
needed before the engineering could catch up. CG Elder, “The St. Clair Tunnel” (1991)
423 Canadian Rail 122.
25 “Bridge Information”, (2000), online: Blue Water Bridge Canada
<http://www.bwba.org/bridgeinfo_e.html>.
26 This geology was cited by Nova Chemical in a trade presentation from 1980 entitled
“Why is Sarnia so Special”, found in the Oil Heritage Museum in Petrolia in August
2007; photograph on file with the author; for more technical information, see Sarnia-
Lambton Environmental Association, Geology of Lambton County (Sarnia, 2005).
27 While they may be “good neighbors” to each other, both refineries and petro-chemical
facilities have struggled to make good neighbors to the communities they are located
in. This has spurred a movement to assist local communities in extracting commitments
from industry, and these have become known as “good neighbor agreements”. See for
example, Lewis, Sanford & Diane Henkels, “Good Neighbor Agreements: A Tool for
Environmental and Social Justice” (1997) 23(4) Social Justice 134–151.
28 Robert D Bott, Evolution of Canada’s oil and gas industry (Calgary, Alberta: Centre
for Energy Information, 2004) at 40.
29 Natural Resources Canada, “The Atlas of Canada — Pipeline Infrastructure”, (2 Sep-
tember 2009), online: NRCan
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is composed of approximately 3,700 km of mainline and branchlines and transports
about 270,000 cubic metres of crude oil a day.30 The portion between Sarnia and
Montreal was reversed in the 1990s when imported light crude became more eco-
nomical for Sarnia’s refineries than western Canadian crude, allowing it to flow
westwards into Sarnia.31 Two other major routes followed: the Transmountain
Pipeline takes crude and refined products from Edmonton to Vancouver, and the
Kinder Morgan Express, the last of the three major pipelines to be built, transports
crude oil from Alberta to Wyoming, Utah and Colorado.32
Contemporary pipeline debates have a distinct urgency to them. They are
driven by the asserted need for “outlets” for hydrocarbons derived from Alberta’s
controversial tar sands region, the expansion of which has created a glut of North
American crude and bitumen said to be stranded inland.33 It is now clear that pipe-
line capacity is presenting the main brake on extraction activities in the tar sands.34
<http://atlas.nrcan.gc.ca/site/english/maps/economic/transportation/pm_pipelines/1>.
Portions of the Interprovincial Pipeline traverse U.S. territory, which gave rise to acri-
monious debates at the time that pitted nationalists concerned primarily with Canadian
energy security against “free marketers” who favoured pipelines along the cheapest
routes possible. G Bruce Doern & Glen Toner, The Politics of Energy: The Develop-
ment and Implementation of the NEP (Toronto: Methuen, 1985). The idea of an east-
west pipeline as a symbol of national unity resurfaced in the contemporary national
energy strategy debates as Frank McKenna, former premier of New Brunswick, wrote
in a June 2012 op-ed to the Globe and Mail that a “pipeline from coast to coast . . .
would be an extraordinary catalyst for economic growth and a powerful symbol of
unity.” Frank McKenna, “Let’s build a Canadian oil pipeline from coast to coast”, (18
June 2012), online: The Globe and Mail <http://www.theglobeandmail.com>.
30 Enbridge Inc, “Liquids Pipeline”, (2011), online: Enbridge
<http://www.enbridge.com>.
31 Enbridge, “Line 9 Reversal Phase I Project Overview”, (2011), online: Enbridge
<http://www.enbridge.com/Line9ReversalProject.aspx>. For more detail, see the sub-
missions of Imperial Oil, paras 999–1003 of transcript (May 24, 2012). The light sweet
crudes travelling to Sarnia from Montreal through Enbridge’s Line 9 originate over-
seas, from tankers docking at Portland, Maine.
32 Natural Resources Canada, supra note 27. A proposed five billion expansion to the
Kinder Morgan Trans Mountain pipeline, meant to rival or replace Enbridge’s Northern
Gateway proposal, was recently announced. David Ebner & Justine Hunter, “U.S. com-
pany plans billion-dollar expansion of Trans Mountain pipeline”, (12 April 2012), on-
line: The Globe and Mail <http://www.theglobeandmail.com>.
33 It is often claimed that plans for billions of dollars worth of new projects proposed in
the coming decade will be shelved if pipeline companies cannot find a way to get oil to
markets. See, for example, Todd Hirsch, “Coming down the pipe(line) in 2012” (2012)
33:2 Policy Options, online: <http://www.irpp.org>.
34 Nathan Vanderklippe, “Canadian crude discount squeezes oil patch”, (6 March 2012),
online: The Globe and Mail <http://www.theglobeandmail.com>. See also Donald
Barry, who takes a more positive spin on it, arguing that a shortage of pipeline capacity
would slow the pace of oil sands development. In his view, industry could focus on
achieving greater operational efficiencies, and government could put better regulations
in place, leading to improved cost structures, lower carbon footprint, fewer strains on
Alberta infrastructure and more time to work out delivery routes. It may also, accord-
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This fact motivates not only the proponents of the projects, but also their foes:
increased pipeline capacity means more tar sands extraction, more greenhouse gas
emissions, and more climate change.
The moniker “dirty oil” is the opposition’s best tool. The operation in Al-
berta’s tar sands has been analogized to putting a tablespoon of molasses into your
sandbox in the summer, letting it soak down deep into the clay, and then trying to
get it back in January.35 As compared to conventional oil, both the extraction pro-
cess and the refining process are much more difficult, energy intensive and harmful
to the environment.36 The production of one barrel of crude from bitumen gener-
ates three times as many greenhouse gas emissions as conventional oil, mainly be-
cause it takes so much natural gas to power up enough heat to effectively melt the
‘molasses’ out of the sand and clay. It consumes 3 barrels of fresh water for every
barrel of oil it produces — and fills enormous tailings lakes with the polluted re-
sult.37, 38, 39
Most Canadian refineries are not even capable of processing the bitumen pro-
duced in the tar sands operations.40 For this reason, much of the crude extracted
there is sent directly to the U.S. Gulf Coast.41 But there is increasing panic from the
ing to Barry, allow Alberta’s bitumen upgrading and refining plans to catch up with oil
sands production, creating more jobs in province and adding value to oil sands exports.
Donald Barry, “Why Keystone Failed and How to Fix It” (2012) 33:2 Policy Options
40 at 42.
35 Journalist Andrew Nikiforuk calls the tar sands “Alberta’s Magic Sandbox.” Andrew
Nikiforuk, “The devil’s tears: Ezra Levant buries the truth in Alberta’s magic sand-
box”, (2011), online: Business Library Online
<http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb6685/is_3_37/ai_n57491547/>.
36 Natural Resources Defense Council, Western Resources Advocates & Pembina Insti-
tute, Driving it Home: Choosing the Right Path for Fueling North America’s Transpor-
tation Future (2007) at 3.
37 Dan Woynillowicz, Oil Sands Fever: The Environmental Implications of Canada’s Oil
Sands Rush (Pembina Institute, 2005) at 29.
38 “Tailings”, (2012), online: OilSandsWatchorg <http://www.pembina.org>.
39 Terra Simieritsch, Joe Obad & Simon Dyer, Tailings Plan Review: An Assessment of
Oil Sands Company Submissions for Compliance with ERCB Directive 074: Tailings
Performance Criteria and Requirements for Oil Sands Mining Schemes (The Pembina
Institute and Water Matters, 2009) at 13.
40 MC Moore et al (2011) “Catching the Brass Ring: Oil Market Potential Diversification
for Canada”, School of Public Policy Research Papers, University of Calgary, at 9.
Also, while fifty-eight per cent of tar sands crude was upgraded in Alberta in 2010, this
number is likely to decline as production increases dramatically in the coming years.
Department of Energy, Alberta, “Talk About Refining and Upgrading in Alberta”,
(January 2012), online: <http://www.energy.alberta.ca>. Even today, Canada’s extrac-
tion of oil sands crude far outstrips its ability to upgrade it, let alone refine it. Canadian
Association of Petroleum Producers (CAPP), Crude Oil: Forecast, Markets & Pipe-
lines (CAPP, 2011) at 10.
41 A total of 56 out of 167 refineries in the U.S. (148) and Canada (19) combined are
located in the U.S. Gulf Coast. These refineries are suited to receive the “heavy” tar
sands crude by virtue of their experience processing heavy crudes from Venezuela and
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oil sector over what is perceived as a bottleneck in the pipeline system that inter-
feres with the ability of tar sands producers to get their product to market.42 The
infrastructure bottleneck in the U.S. Midwest, according to those producers, means
that Canadian oil trades at substantial discount to world benchmarks — costing
them up to $50M a day.43
In the quest for a necessary outlet for Canadian crude, there are at least three
major options currently being contemplated.44 The first two proposals, TransCan-
ada’s Keystone XL and Enbridge’s Northern Gateway, provide the necessary con-
text to understand the significance of the third proposal — Enbridge’s Line 9 Re-
versal, for the task of situating Sarnia in the contemporary pipeline debates. The
Line 9 Reversal is ultimately the central focus of my analytical work exposing the
active unimagining of the Aamjiwnaang First Nation community in the national
energy picture.
(a) The route to the south: Keystone XL
TransCanada’s proposed Keystone XL project, would eventually carry up to
700,000 barrels of crude per day from Alberta through the American Midwest. Ca-
nadian portions of this line have already cleared regulatory approvals,45 but garner-
ing support from the Americans has been difficult.46 Republicans argue that the
project will generate jobs, and help the U.S. move to a more secure energy future
by reducing dependence on oil producers from what they see as unfriendly political
regimes.47 Feeding this frenzy are Canadian state-sponsored lobbying campaigns
the Persian Gulf. Morey Burnham, Tracking Tar Sands Crudes (Washington DC:
Earthworks, 2010) at 4-5.
42 The epicentre of this glut, as far as Canadian crude is concerned, is the American oil
crossroads of Cushing, Oklahoma. See also Scott Haggett, “Analysis: Canada’s ‘Cush-
ing moment’: A northern pipeline crisis looms”, (29 March 2012), online: Reuters
<http://www.reuters.com>.
43 Nathan Vanderklippe, “Oil price gap costs producers $50-million a day”, (27 March
2012), online: The Globe and Mail <http://www.theglobeandmail.com>.
44 At the time this article went to press, even more options were emerging. For example,
the Globe and Mail revealed that TransCanada was making plans to convert parts of its
cross-country natural gas pipeline network to transport crude oil. Access to eastern
Canada refineries is one objective, but exports “must be part of the mix”, as well. Oth-
erwise, the two large refineries on the east coast (Irving in NB, and Korea National
Oil’s facility in Nfld.) would be placed in an unacceptably good negotiating position,
according to insiders. Carrie Tait and Nathan Vanderclipe, “TransCanada eyes an east
coast export alternative”, Globe and Mail, October 4, 2012, B5.
45 Governor General in Council, “PC Number: 2010-0489”, (22 April 2010), online:
Privy Council Office <http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca>.
46 Shawn McCarthy & Nathan Vanderklippe, “TransCanada reapplies for Keystone XL
permit”, (4 May 2012), online: The Globe and Mail
<http://www.theglobeandmail.com>.
47 Christopher Helman, “Romney’s Billionaire Energy Advisor Lays Out His Vision For
Energy Independence”, (21 March 2012), online: Forbes.com
<http://www.shortform.com>.
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that have sought to re-brand tar sands crude as “ethical oil”.48
Critics fiercely oppose the project, suggesting it will raise gasoline prices,49
increase the emission of greenhouse gases,50 create the risk of spills over critical
aquifers,51 and pose a risk to pipeline safety.52 Environmentalists argue that the
transport of diluted bitumen through pipelines is a risky and largely untested pro-
position. “Dil-bit”, as it is known, poses a greater risk of pipeline rupture due to its
abrasive and viscous nature.53 The concentrations of toxins that it contains present
major risks to human health and natural ecosystems.54
President Obama rejected the application early in 2012, saying the Congress-
imposed deadline did not allow for a full environmental assessment.55 But Obama
did invite TransCanada to propose a new route, and in March 2012 he cleared the
way for it to begin immediate construction of the southern portion of the Keystone
XL — from Cushing, Oklahoma, through to the Texas refineries, with an expedited
48 The ethical oil campaign, led online at <http://www.ethicaloil.com>, was founded by a
Conservative Staffer recently promoted to the Prime Minister’s Office. Campbell
Clark, “Tory staffer who left Hill to plug ‘ethical’ oil lands job in Harper’s office”, (14
November 2011), online: The Globe and Mail <http://www.theglobeandmail.com>.
See also charges that the Harper government itself is acting as a “lobbyist” for Big Oil
in the dispute over the European Fuel Quality Directive: Dirty Oil Diplomacy: The
Canadian Government’s Global Push to Sell the Tar Sands (Climate Action Network
Canada, 2012).
49 The reason is simple. Economist Robyn Allen explains (speaking specifically of the
Northern Gateway, but the logic is the same): Much of the profit expected by pipeline
companies is “attributable to the higher prices Canadian producers expect to capture,
every year . . . because the pipeline is built. Since these prices are realized on every
barrel of oil produced, not just on barrels exported, the price increase is borne by Cana-
dian refiners and directly passed onto consumers and business.” See also Tar Sands Oil
Means High Gas Prices (Corporate Ethics International, 2010).
50 Public Works and Government Services Canada, GHG Emissions (Natural Resources
Canada, 2012).
51 John Stansbury, Analysis of Frequency, Magnitude and Consequence of Worst-Case
Spills From the Proposed Keystone XL Pipeline (University of Nebraska Water Center,
2011) at 17.
52 Ibid. at 36. Bill McKibben’s 350.org has been credited with organizing much of the
resistance in the US. Resistance has also been organized at: “Tar Sands Action”,
(2012), online: Tar Sands Action <http://www.tarsandsaction.org/>. McKibben has
been called the “hero and spiritual leader of the crusade to stop keystone.” Margaret
Wente, “With Keystone, it’s Harvard vs. the heartland”, (8 February 2012), online: The
Globe and Mail <http://www.theglobeandmail.com>.
53 Anthony Swift et al, Tar Sands Pipelines Safety Risks (Natural Resources Defense
Council, National Wildlife Federation, Pipeline Safety Trust and the Sierra Club,
2011).
54 For example, 60% of those living near the spill of Dil-bit into the Kalamazoo River in
July 2010 experienced symptoms consistent with acute exposure to chemicals like ben-
zene. Martha Stanbury, Acute Health Effects of the Enbridge Oil Spill (Michigan De-
partment of Community Health, 2010).
55 McCarthy & Vanderklippe, supra note 6.
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approval process to help clear the bottleneck in capacity.56 In September 2012,
TransCanada reapplied for a building permit, proposing a new route that it claims
will avoid the ecologically sensitive aquifers of Nebraska.57
(b) The route west: Northern Gateway
Prime Minister Harper’s tough talk, in the wake of Obama’s rejection of a
decision he had once called a “complete no-brainer”,58 was relentless — if “we”
cannot get an outlet to the south, he said, we will get one to Asia.59 The second
high-profile proposal on the table is Enbridge’s Northern Gateway Project. Accord-
ing to the plan currently before a Joint Review Panel of the National Energy
Board,60 the Northern Gateway would connect Alberta’s tar sands with a northern
B.C. marine terminal sited in Kitimat.61 From there, 225 tankers annually would
transport the crude across the Pacific to Asia.62
The project has the support of many politicians in the federal cabinet whose
posturing in the spring of 2012 reached a fever pitch: Canada must diversify away
from its exclusive U.S. customer, in the national interest.63 But the pipeline lacks
widespread support in BC. Most British Columbians scoff at the idea of tankers off
their coast, and they oppose the chosen route which traverses sensitive mountain-
ous terrain including the Great Bear Rainforest.64 Environmentalists, opposition
56 Megan Slack, “Expanding Our Oil and Gas Pipeline Infrastructure”, (22 March 2012),
online: The White House <http://www.whitehouse.gov>.
57 These aquifers exist in the “Sandhills” region of Nebraska. The Sandhills are especially
permeable soil, meaning that bitumen spilled upon them would inevitably and fully
leak into the water tables below. Opposition to the previous plan put forth by Trans-
Canada centered on this potentiality. Shawn McCarthy, “TransCanada revises Key-
stone route”, (5 September 2012), online: The Globe and Mail
<http://www.theglobeandmail.com>.
58 Shawn McCarthy, “Keystone pipeline approval ‘complete no-brainer,’ Harper says”,
(26 September 2011), online: The Globe and Mail
<http://www.theglobeandmail.com>.
59 CBC News, “Harper looks to Asian energy markets after Keystone delay — Politics”,
(14 November 2011), online: <http://www.cbc.ca>.
60 The NEB conducts quasi-judicial hearings, usually by 3 of 9 Board members for major
project applications. In order for these projects to be approved, the Board must issue a
Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity.
61 Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency, “Application”, (5 July 2010), online:
Enbridge Northern Gateway Project <http://gatewaypanel.review-examen.gc.ca>.
62 Nathan Lemphers, Pipeline to Nowhere? Uncertainty and unanswered questions about
the Enbridge Northern Gateway Pipeline (The Pembina Institute).
63 This rhetoric is front and center in the following presentation by Natural Resource
Minister Joe Oliver. Reuters Video Gallery, “Canada must diversify energy exports,
official says”, (2 December 2011), online: <http://www.reuters.com>. See also Peter
Kent, “After Kyoto and Durban: A question of balance” (2012) 33:2 Policy Options 10.
64 Anthony Swift et al, Pipeline and Tanker Trouble: The Impact to British Columbia’s
Communities, Rivers, and Pacific Coastline from Tar Sands Oil Transports (The Pem-
bina Institute, 2011).
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parties, and aboriginal groups are fiercely opposed.65 At least half of the route
crosses unceded territory in B.C., raising the likely prospect of constitutional
claims that will take years to resolve.66 Injunctions and civil disobedience will in-
evitably follow.67
The power dynamic shifted in the spring of 2012 with the introduction of the
Jobs, Growth and Long-term Prosperity Act.68 Among the changes introduced
were measures to severely curtail public reviews. The Minister also gained a new
power to shut down an environmental assessment deemed to be taking too long.69
Finally, the new Act gives Cabinet the power to override a decision of the suppos-
edly arms-length NEB, even where that Board concludes that a pipeline is not in
the Canadian public interest.70
Overall, the terrain is shifting constantly. “Big oil” — as a category — in fact
obscures the extent to which different energy interests are actively jockeying for
position, seeking to get out front, and to secure certain routes and preferential con-
tracts in advance of their competitors. The best example of this is the current race
between Kinder Morgan Partner’s proposal to twin its Transmountain pipeline and
Northern Gateway — the two are seen to be in direct competition,71 both seeking to
65 Mike Hudema, “One Keystone pipeline down, one Gateway pipeline to go”, Green-
peace Canada (18 January 2012), online: <http://www.greenpeace.org>.
66 A similar tactic was successfully used in 2007 by the Tsiliqot against would-be loggers.
Nancy MacDonald, “Crack in the Northern Gateway pipe dream”, (20 January 2012),
online: Macleansca <http://www2.macleans.ca>.
67 See, for example, Gordon Christie, “Indigenous Authority, Canadian Law, and Pipeline
Proposals” (this issue).
68 Jobs, Growth and Long-term Prosperity Act (S.C. 2012, c. 19),
<http://parlgc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Language=E&Mode=1&DocId=
5524 772> [hereinafter the JGLTPA]. When it was Bill C-38, opposition attempts to
have the bill split into pieces and examined separately at committee failed; as did at-
tempts to delay the bill through filibuster. Bill Curry, “871 amendments aimed at
‘bully’ budget”, (10 June 2012), online: The Globe and Mail
<http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/871-amendments-aimed-at-bully-
budget/article4246053/>.
69 The Act will provide for some limited exceptions to the new time limits, to be author-
ized by the Minister.
70 The previous Cabinet veto power essentially becomes a Cabinet override: the NEB will
lose its exclusive jurisdiction, with Cabinet becoming the final arbiter on pipeline ap-
plication decisions. This is pursuant to the JGLTPA, which alters s. 54(1) of the Na-
tional Energy Board Act to read: “After the Board has submitted its report under sec-
tion 52 or 53, the Governor in Council may, by order, (a) direct the Board to issue a
certificate in respect of the pipeline or any part of it and to make the certificate subject
to the terms and conditions set out in the report; or (b) direct the Board to dismiss the
application for a certificate.”
71 Indeed, Kinder Morgan has written the NEB as an intervener in opposition to Northern
Gateway. Kinder Morgan, Letter from Kinder Morgan to Joint Review Panel — En-
bridge Northern Gateway Project (2010). On the other hand, industry insiders also
often claim that there will be plenty of capacity for both pipelines, and more. Consider
for example, an upcoming conference entitled the “Crude Oil Markets, Rail & Pipeline
Takeaway Summit” which will focus on developing new “takeaway infrastructure to
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deliver tar sands crude to tankers on the B.C. coast and eventually, Asian markets.
While the Northern Gateway has been troubling B.C. environmentalists for two
years, it now seems perhaps more likely that the Kinder Morgan plan, which would
double its capacity to transport tar sands crude to port, and double the tanker traffic
in Burrard Inlet, will prevail — its advantage being that the pipe is already laid.72
This is also true for Enbridge’s “plan B”, the third major outlet being pursued, and
the most significant for residents of Sarnia and the Aamjiwnaang First Nation.
(c) The route east: The Line 9 Reversal
The prospect of bitumen travelling east by pipeline is eagerly received in some
camps. There is a growing chorus of voices now calling attention to the need to
extract more economic benefits and jobs from the tar sands, leading to proposals
for upgrading bitumen in Canada rather than shipping it directly abroad.73 Mean-
while, behind the scenes, several companies in Canada intend to increase their ca-
pacity for processing tar sands crude in the coming years — with billions of dol-
lars’ worth of upgraders and refineries planned for Alberta’s heartland, and for
other industrial centres across the country, most notably Sarnia.74
According to StatsCan, close to all of the crude oil refined in Sarnia is re-
ceived by pipeline.75 About 84% comes from the western provinces, with the re-
cost-efficiently take crude to new markets in the form of both pipeline and rail”, online:
<http://www.crude-markets-rail-capacity-canada.com/>.
72 Mike Lee, Jeremy van Loon & Mike Lee, “Kinder Morgan Lapping Enbridge in Cana-
dian Pipeline Race: Energy”, (2 February 2012), online: Bloomberg
<http://www.bloomberg.com>. The proposal would require a dredging of the Second
Narrows channel in Vancouver Harbour. Patrick Brown, “Supertankers could take over
Vancouver Harbour”, Island Tides (17 May 2012), online: <www.islandtides.com>.
This is not to say that the KinderMorgan plan does not face opposition. Late summer
2012 members of the Squamish and Tsleil-Waututh nations organized a paddle in the
Salish Sea to demonstrate their displeasure with the plan. Tsleil-Waututh chief, Justin
George, stated: “The people reside here have an obligation to speak up . . . the real
benefits aren’t here. The real benefits are at the tarsands, to Alberta, to Kinder Morgan
shareholders, and to China.” Justin Mcelroy, Squamish and Tsleil-Waututh paddle to
protest Kinder Morgan pipeline expansion, <http://www.theprovince.com/
news/Squamish+Tsleil+Waututh+paddle+protest+Kinder+Morgan+pipeline+expansion/
7179985/story.html#ixzz2840zXPMk>.
73 Eric Reguly, “Why Keystone XL is a mistake”, (29 December 2011), online: The
Globe and Mail Report on Business <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-busi-
ness/rob-magazine/why-keystone-xl-is-a-mistake/article2286199/>.
74 There has also been a proposal put forward for a refinery in Kitimat, B.C. Such a pro-
ject may increase the viability of Northern Gateway as it would preclude many political
and environmental concerns — chiefly, the need to transport bitumen by tanker — as
well as provide significant economic stimulus to the region. Gordon Gibson, “Kitimat
refinery would be a game-changer”, (20 August 2012), online: The Globe and Mail
Commentary, <http://www.theglobeandmail.com>.
75 The Supply and Disposition of Refined Petroleum Products in Canada, April 2012 at
49 (Table 5-1. Supply and disposition of petroleum products, Ontario — Refinery sup-
ply of crude oil, feedstock charged and total refined petroleum products).
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mainder coming though Montreal, mainly from ports in Maine unloading tankers
originating overseas.76 Most of the crude oil is derived from conventional sources,
but at least 20% of the “feedstock” received in 2011 was in the form of crude
bitumen or oil derived from upgrading bitumen.77 This proportion is increasing and
is forecasted to be as high as 80% by 2015.78 Sarnia’s Suncor facility is one of the
destinations for bitumen and its derivatives from Alberta. In 2004, the company
began a billion-dollar project to increase the amount of oil sands crude that it could
upgrade, and in a 2007 statement, Suncor boasted about its aim to eventually enable
the Sarnia refinery to process up to 40,000 barrels of oil sands crude per day.79
Since 2007, the prospects for increased refining of tar sands crude in eastern
Canada have only improved. Long-time Sarnia Mayor Mike Bradley delivered a
speech shortly after Obama’s rejection of the Keystone XL that gave rise to a head-
line claiming, “Sarnia vying for Keystone oil”.80 High-profile commentators like
former New Brunswick premier Frank McKenna are calling for a pipeline from
“coast-to-coast”, noting that while securing west coast access to markets for tar
sands crude is proving difficult, east coast access is “particularly promising.”81
76 There was some indication in the context of the NEB hearings into Line 9, however,
that the pipeline coming into Sarnia from Westover was not in use in very recent years
(2011 and 2012). This is up from roughly 60% in 2007. Supply and Disposition of
Refined Petroleum Products in Canada, December 2007,
<http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/45-004-x/45-004-x2007012-eng.pdf>
77 The Supply and Disposition of Refined Petroleum Products in Canada, April 2012.
<http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/45-004-x/45-004-x2012004-eng.pdf>.
78 Canada Oil Sands Opportunities and Challenges to 2015: An Update — Energy Market
Assessment — June 2006, available: <http://www.neb.gc.ca/clf-nsi/rnrgyn
fmtn/nrgyrprt/lsnd/pprtntsndchllngs20152006/pprtntsndchllngs20152006-eng.pdf>.
79 Suncor Energy, News Release: Suncor Energy’s Sarnia refinery completes project to
improve environmental performance and strengthen integration with oil sands opera-
tion, November 26, 2007.
80 Tyler Kula, “Sarnia vying for Keystone oil — Local — News — Sarnia Observer”, (17
January 2012), online: Sarnia Observer
<http://www.theobserver.ca/ArticleDisplay.aspx?e=3439083>.
81 McKenna, supra note 27. Similarly, former Bank of Canada governor David Dodge
stated: “You’ve got to get the stuff to market. And I guess I keep thinking that the
really interesting thing is B.C. and the Indians are going to make it difficult to go
across the mountains. Bring it east, right?” Mr Dodge told the Globe, saying he be-
lieves hundreds of millions of barrels of bitumen could be upgraded daily in central and
Atlantic Canadian cities” (Josh Wingrove and Jeremy Torobin, “Former Bank of Can-
ada governor breaks rank with successor over consumer debt”, The Globe and Mail,
June 18, 2012, <http://m.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/former-bank-of-canada-
governor-breaks-rank-with-successor-over-consumer-debt/article2419843/?service=
mobile>). More recently, NDP leader Thomas Mulcair threw his support behind the
plan in a speech to the Canadian Club of Toronto on September 28, 2012: “Let me be
clear, New Democrats support recent proposals to increase West-East pipeline capac-
ity. This is an initiative, led by industry that will pay economic dividends for every
region of our country: New markets for producers in the West, high-paying value-ad-
ded jobs and lower energy prices in the East”, online:
<http://www.ndp.ca/news/building-balanced-21st-century-economy>.
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The lynchpin in this plan is the reversal of Enbridge’s Line 9, the portion of
the Interprovincial which currently runs westwards between Montreal and Sarnia.
As its proponents note, the virtue of this plan is that most of the pipe is already in
place:82 its “re-purposing” would “allow Western crude to be brought all the way to
Quebec, supplying a number of refineries along the way”.83 From there, it could
link up with the Portland-Montreal pipeline to allow access to the tidal waters of
Portland, Maine, and overseas exports,84 and with the addition of a pipeline ex-
tending from Quebec to Saint John, the Irving refinery in New Brunswick could
also be supplied.85
The first hurdle for Enbridge was cleared on July 27, 2012. Enbridge received
regulatory approval from the NEB to re-reverse the flow of the portion of Line 9
that connects the terminal at Sarnia and the station in North Westover, near Hamil-
ton.86 This project is referred to as the “Line 9 Reversal Phase I”, and purports to
respond to the request of one customer, Imperial Oil, for access to western crudes
for its Nanticoke refinery.87 What is now “Phase I”, however, was in 2008 a part of
Enbridge’s later abandoned “Trailbreaker” proposal to facilitate the flow of western
heavy crudes all the way to Montreal, and eventually onto oil tankers bound for the
Gulf of Mexico through Portland, Maine.88 In fact, before the NEB even held the
hearing into the Line 9 Reversal “Phase I” proposal, Enbridge had stated publicly
its intention to seek permission from the NEB to reverse the remainder of Line 9’s
flow once Phase I is complete.89
82 It is a potential masterstroke for Enbridge: by virtue of requiring minimal construction
on a small portion of already-operating pipeline, the proposed Line 9 Reversal skirt the
issues that have dogged the Keystone XL and Northern Gateway proposals.
83 McKenna, supra note 27.
84 Jeffrey Jones, “Green groups seek wider review of Enbridge project”, (26 August
2011), online: Reuters <http://www.reuters.com>.
85 Ibid. See the map available at the Globe & Mail:
<http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/conduits-to-the-east/article4602
851/?from=4602808>.
86 Letter from National Energy Board to Ms Chantal Robert, Supervisor of Regulatory
Affairs, Enbridge Pipelines Inc (27 July 2012), online: National Energy Board
<http://www.neb-one.gc.ca> “Decision Letter”.
87 Letter from Imperial Oil Limited to Ms Anne-Marie Erickson, National Energy
Board/Secretary (20 September 2011), online: National Energy Board
<http://www.neb-one.gc.ca>. This concern is sometimes referred to by Enbridge as
“the business demands of shippers.” See Enbridge Pipelines Inc, “Application Pursuant
to Section 58 of the NEB Act”, (8 August 2011), online: Enbridge <https://www.neb-
one.gc.ca>.
88 Enbridge Pipelines Inc (“Enbridge”) Line 9 Reversal Phase I Project, Application
under Section 58 of the National Energy Board Act (“NEB Act”), File OF-Fac-Oil-
E101-2011-01 01, Enbridge Response to National Energy Board Information Request
No. 1, online: <https://www.neb-one.gc.ca/ll-eng/livelink.exe/fetch/2000/
90464/90552/92263/706191/706437/739010/A2G0L1_-_Enbridge_Response_to_NEB
_Information_Request_No._1?nodeid=739014&vernum=0>.
89 Enbridge, Line 9B Reversal Project Overview, online:
<http://www.enbridge.com/ECRAI/Line9BReversalProject.aspx>.
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(d) Situating Sarnia, spatially
The significance of the Line 9 Reversal for Sarnia and the Aamjiwnnaang
First Nation is this: by cutting off the supply from the east, it will force the refin-
eries there to rely near-solely on western sources of oil, leaving them increasingly
reliant on emissions-heavy fuels, such as tar sands crude. In other words, the pro-
portion of “feedstock” for Sarnia-area refineries that is derived from bitumen will
shift. The roughly 15% of the crude refined in Sarnia that currently comes from
eastern ports is light crude; this will be replaced by western sources — at the same
time that the proportion of western crudes stemming from the tar sands is also ex-
pected to keep rising. For people living downstream of these refineries — for the
Aamjiwnaang First Nation — this means more, and more deadly, air pollution and
the added risk of spills of diluted bitumen to contaminate the water and soils of
their traditional territory.
But greater access to western crudes is eagerly sought by industry in the area,
as Mayor Bradley’s position underlines. Sarnia remains an attractive destination to
investors: its cachet lies not only in its skilled workforce, but in its “supply conve-
nience” and hyper-connectivity that derives in part from geography.90 To orient
this discussion spatially, I turn now to the situation on the ground.91
Lake Huron drains into the St. Clair River which flows south into Lake St.
Clair towards Detroit, and eventually into the Atlantic Ocean through Lake Erie,
Lake Ontario and the St. Lawrence River. The golf courses, sandy beaches and
executive estates along the south shore of Lake Huron slowly give way to the City
of Sarnia, a solid working class core and an industrial corridor home to 40% of
Canada’s chemical production.92 This cluster of petrochemical plants and refineries
runs along the St. Clair River, site of the infamous “toxic blob” of the 1980s, and
eventually leads right up to the fenceline of the Aamjiwnaang First Nation
reserve.93
The reserve lands have dwindled over the years through various surrenders
and suspect land deals, highway expansions and municipal annexations.94 Pipelines
now traverse and refineries and petroleum storage tanks now encircle the reserve.
90 See for example: “Bio-Industrial Park Sarnia”, online:
<http://www.bioindustrialparksarnia.com>.
91 Elaine MacDonald & Sarah Rang, Exposing Canada’s Chemical Valley: An investiga-
tion of cumulative air pollution emissions in the Sarnia, Ontario area (Ecojustice,
2007).
92 Ibid.
93 Laurie Adkin’s study of unions and environmentalists around Chemical Valley from
the 1950s through the 1990s offers a fascinating case study on the discovery and after-
math of the toxic blob and the general dynamics of Sarnia’s political economy. Laurie
E Adkin, “The Politics of Sustainable Development: Citizens, Union and the Corpora-
tions” (1998, Black Rose Books).
94 Sarah Wiebe, Anatomy of Place: Ecological Citizenship in Canada’s Chemical Valley,
PhD Dissertation in Political Science, University of Ottawa, forthcoming. It is an in-
dustrial history facilitated, of course, by colonial law. See also, The Chippewas of
Sarnia Band v. Canada (Attorney General), 2000 CarswellOnt 117 (C.A.).
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There are at least 60 high-emitting facilities within 25 km.95 Each of these facilities
is required to report to the National Pollutant Release Inventory (NPRI), a legis-
lated, publicly accessible inventory of high-volume toxic emissions in Canada.96 In
2011, the World Health Organization rated Sarnia’s air quality to be the worst in
the country.97
In recent years, the Health and Environment Committee of the Aamjiwnaang
Band Council has documented a wide range of environmental health effects tied to
the high burden of pollution.98 The people of Aamjiwnaang routinely experience
anxiety and fear related to the frequent industrial “releases” or “incidents” that are
part of everyday life in Chemical Valley, but there is some indication that the slow
poisoning is what they have come to dread most.99 The chronic health risks of
living beside a refinery, or worse — a cluster of refineries — are now well
known.100 Residents express “a building anger and lingering sadness upon learning
the extent of their health problems and the mounting evidence linking those
problems to the actions of their industrial neighbours”.101 The next section surveys
the legal landscape governing the release of pollution in Sarnia, and the convoluted
“vapour trail of blame” that Aamjiwnaang residents must attempt to navigate as
they deal with the mounting health concerns.102
95 Of these, only 15 are American. MacDonald & Rang, supra note 91.
96 Environment Canada, “National Pollutant Release Inventory”, (22 February 2012), on-
line: <http://www.ec.gc.ca/inrp-npri/>. For a critique of the NPRI, see Kathryn Harri-
son & Werner Antweiler, “Incentives for pollution abatement: Regulation, regulatory
threats, and non-governmental pressures” (2003) 22:3 Journal of Policy Analysis and
Management 361. See also John Jackson, A Citizen’s Guide to the National Pollutant
Release Inventory (Canadian Institute for Environmental Law and Policy, 2000).
97 Tara Jeffrey, “Sarnia’s air Canada’s worst”, Sarnia Observer (27 September 2011), on-
line: Communities <http://www.theobserver.ca>. This distinction was recently lost to
the town of Hinton, Alberta. World Health Organization, Urban Outdoor Air Pollution
Database, by country and city (2012).
98 Presentations made to the 2008 Environmental Health Symposium by Ada Lockridge,
Ron Plain & Margaret Keith; presentations made to the 2011 Community Forum on
Pollution and Action by Sharilyn Johnston and Sarah Wiebe, Wilson Plain Jr, Jim
Brophy and Margaret Keith, among others (notes on file with author).
99 (Amended) Notice of Application to Divisional Court for Judicial Review, filed by Ada
Lockridge and Ron Plain, at 14 (available at ecojustice.ca). See also, for example, the
recent mixed-art documentary film, “Indian Givers” (2012), produced by the
Sarnia/Aamjiwnaang-based Kiijig Collective, made collaboratively by and for Native
and non-Native youth, shot and edited by Ian Alexander of Rocketship Productions and
high school student Sadie Mallon.
100 See, for example, Lars Barregard, Erik Holmberg & Gerd Sallsten, “Leukaemia inci-
dence in people living close to an oil refinery” (2009) 109:8 Environmental Research
985; S Sans et al, “Cancer incidence and mortality near the Baglan Bay petrochemical
works, South Wales” (1995) 52:4 Occupational and Environmental Medicine 217.
Three of eastern Canada’s ten major refineries are in the Sarnia area: Imperial Oil,
Suncor and Shell.
101 Scott, supra note 19 at 306.
102 Nixon, supra note 1 at 136.
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(e) Situating Sarnia in the Legal Landscape
The topography is complex. There are multiple layers of legal ordering that
govern the release of pollution in Sarnia. The central features have been described
elsewhere;103 here I highlight some recent developments. In late 2010, two re-
sidents of the Aamjiwnaang First Nation filed a court challenge based on the Cana-
dian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. It is a judicial review application arguing
that the cumulative impact of the relentless release of pollutants into the air author-
ized by the Ministry of the Environment (MOE) affects the members of the com-
munity in a way that is fundamentally unfair, and is thus unconstitutional.104 The
basis of the claim is this: Ontario’s air pollution regulation fails miserably when it
is applied to several large, high-emitting facilities clustered together. That regula-
tion allows the MOE to continue to hand out permits without taking into account
the background levels of pollution already present.105 For pollution hotspots like
Sarnia, the regime is completely inadequate to protect the health of residents down-
wind,106 and the Ministry all but acknowledges this.107
Ron Plain and Ada Lockridge, members of the Aamjiwnaang First Nation,
claim that the chronic exposures to pollution, and the MOE’s failure to assess the
cumulative effects on their health, constitutes a violation of their rights to life, lib-
erty and security of the person under s. 7 and their equality rights under s. 15.108
Specifically, they challenge the Ministry’s granting of a new permit to Suncor that
allows it to expand its refining operations, and thus increase its release of air pollu-
tants, such as benzene, without any assessment of the cumulative impacts on the
health of affected residents of Aamjiwnaang.
Benzene is known as a “non-threshold” toxicant — a substance for which
harmful effects are expected to occur at any level of exposure.109 It is also consid-
ered to be carcinogenic to humans and is linked to the incidence of leukemia.110
Benzene is present in crude oil and gasoline and is used as a raw material in the
production of chemicals, such as styrene, and in the manufacture of goods such as
dyes, amongst many others.111 Significant benzene emissions are tied to petroleum
103 Scott, 2008, supra note 19.
104 Ada Lockridge & Ron Plain, Notice of Application to Divisional Court for Judicial
Review (Ecojustice, 2010).
105 For a discussion of a parallel problem with environmental regulation of Alberta’s tar
sands, see Angela Carter, Regulating the Environmental Impacts of Alberta’s Tar
Sands, in L Adkin, B Miller, N Kroeman & R Haluza-Delay, First World Petro-Polit-
ics: The Political Ecology of Alberta (2012).
106 Scott, supra note 19 at 321–328.
107 Environmental Commissioner for Ontario (ECO), Neglecting our Obligations: 2005-
2006 Annual Report — Supplement (Toronto: ECO, 2006).
108 Lockridge & Plain, supra note 101.
109 Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment, Canada-Wide Standard for Ben-
zene, 2010 Final Report, January 2012, <http://www.ccme.ca/assets/pdf/ 2010_ben-
zene_rpt_final_e.pdf>, at 1 [hereinafter “CCME”].
110 Ibid.
111 Ibid. at 2.
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refining and chemicals production.112 As a volatile hydrocarbon, benzene is a
known component of the “fugitive” emissions from refineries,113 and has been re-
leased accidentally in several high profile spills or leaks in Sarnia’s Chemical
Valley.114
If we consider this pollution and its effects on the health of residents in the
context of their status as First Nations people on reserve, the question of their con-
stitutional rights comes into sharp relief. The First Nation is tied to the land; con-
fined to a small portion of its traditional territory that happens to be directly down-
wind of the industrial cluster. That residents should now be expected to endure
these threats to their well-being, perpetuated by the Ministry’s failure to enact an
effective, health-protective air pollution regime, they argue, is a violation of s. 7.
That they should be forced to choose between subjecting themselves and their fam-
ilies to these risks, and leaving the reserve at great social, economic and cultural
cost, they say, also demonstrates that their equality rights are infringed. It is a
choice that non-native Canadians do not confront.
3. PART III: UNIMAGINED COMMUNITIES AT THE END OF
THE PIPE
A broader aim of this paper is to understand the larger socio-historical and
politico-legal forces that have furthered the accumulation of pollution burdens in
particular places.115 Pollution in Sarnia persists despite lots of “law” in place to
curb it. I have argued in the past that this is, at least in part, because it continues to
be cast as “unintentional”.116 What we are talking about, after all, is intentional
economic activity (the refining of oil, the production of petro-chemicals) that we
know produces emissions known to cause certain identifiable health effects that
people in Aamjiwnaang are experiencing at disproportionate levels. Casting the
pollution as unintentional allows the communities downstream to remain hidden —
to remain “unimagined” in the national energy debate. But Nixon’s notion of
“unimagining” is considerably more active than this: it depends on “energetically
112 CCME, supra note 109, at Table 1. The most significant sources however, are vehicle
emissions, wood combustion for home heating and natural gas dehydrators.
113 Chambers et al, supra.
114 See for example, Jack Poirier, “Sarnia issues warning after benzene vapor leak at
plant”, Times Herald (March 15, 2008). An earlier spill resulted in a fine of $550,000
against Nova Chemical in Sarnia for “discharging or causing or permitting the dis-
charge of a contaminant, namely benzene, into the natural environment that caused or
was likely to have caused an adverse effect”. R. v. Nova Chemicals (January 16, 2008),
Sarnia IEB file #4602-6H3R67 (Ont. C.J.) (Prosecution Disposition Report (Trial)).
For more detail on these incidents and their effect on the Aamjiwnaang community, see
D Scott, 2008, supra note 19.
115 As Ali, supra note 12 at 97 argues, this is the type of inquiry that may lead to environ-
mental justice analyses that move beyond description to explanation.
116 For a more complete account of how this pollution comes to be regarded as “uninten-
tional”, please see Scott, 2008, supra note 19.
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inculcated habits of imaginative limit”.117 He states: 
[A]ssaults on a nation’s environmental resources frequently depend not just
on the physical displacement of local communities, but on their imaginative
displacement as well, indeed on the prior rhetorical and visual evacuation of
those communities from the idea of the developing nation state.118
To follow Nixon’s analytical frame, the ability to maintain the tar sands as an
icon of national ascent requires the descending prospects of communities whose
basic ecology is tied to the land, air, and water being impacted by their expansion.
The active use of the faculty of imagination is essential to the construction of a
national identity that underlies a national energy vision. In the building of such a
national identity, we can find instances of the vigorous exclusion of other visions
such that communities whose very existence inconveniences or contradicts the de-
sired narrative must be unimagined. Mechanisms or strategies of imaginative dis-
placement may be varied, and here I explore the ways that the Aamjiwnaang First
Nation community is unimagined in the national energy debates through the indi-
rect violence of narrow legal reasoning and interpretations by the NEB, and
through prior rhetorical de-legitimation by the federal cabinet.
(a) Active Unimagining in the Words and Deeds of the National Energy
Board
The mechanism is one that Nixon terms indirect violence: unimagining hap-
pens through the “bloodless, technocratic” and “pseudo-neutral”119 voice of law.
Here I demonstrate its operation in the NEB ruling on Enbridge’s Line 9 Reversal
“Phase I” application. As is the case for many environmental assessments, the criti-
cal issue in this case came down to the “scope” of the project.120 The NEB was
charged with assessing the environmental effects associated with “the Project”, in-
cluding effects on both bio-physical elements like air and water quality or fish
habitat, and socio-economic effects such as traditional land and resource uses or
human health impacts.
To say the NEB scoped the project narrowly is hyperbolic. Facing 18 regis-
tered intervenors that included the Aamjiwnaang First Nation, energy corporations,
environmental organizations including Equiterre and Environmental Defence, land-
owners associations, and several provincial ministries, as well as petitions from
concerned citizens, comments from several other aboriginal bands, including the
Haudenosaunee Confederacy Chiefs Council, and crowds of Six Nations activists
and their supporters that were ejected from the public hearings (necessitating un-
117 Rob Nixon, (2010) Unimagined Communities — Developmental Refugees, Mega-
Dams, and Monumental Modernity, 69 New Formations 62–80 at 62.
118 Ibid. at 62.
119 Ibid. at 73.
120 See for example, Doelle & Tollefson, supra note 117 at 358. David R Boyd, Unnatural
Law: Rethinking Canadian Environmental Law and Policy (UBC Press, 2003) at 152.
Jamie Benidickson, Environmental Law, 3rd Revised ed. (Irwin Law, 2008) at 259.
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precedented security arrangements),121 the NEB characterized “the Project” they
were assessing as follows: 
The Project includes the infrastructure additions and modifications (related
to pumps, piping, valves, [etc.] at four existing fenced and graveled sites
along Line 9 . . . A new electrical building would also be installed . . . All
construction work would be completed on existing Enbridge facilities and
surface leases with no planned ground disturbances along the Line 9 right-
of-way itself.122
Deciding that “the Project” consisted of infrastructure work at four existing
fenced and graveled sites allowed the Board to conclude that “the Project sites . . .
do not traverse Indian Reserve lands”123 even though the affected pipeline runs
directly under the Aamjiwnaang reserve and the Line 9 segment to be reversed is
within the traditional territory of Aamjiwnaang First Nation, as well as the territo-
ries of several other Bands including the Chippewas of the Thames and the Oneida
Nation of the Thames. In its assessment of possible effects on Traditional Land and
Resource Use and on Human Health, the NEB noted under the heading “Project-
Environment Interactions” that there would be “No interaction: Construction activi-
ties would occur on previously-disturbed, existing industrial sites”.124 In other
words, the Board’s assessment of the environmental effects of this project — one
that several intervenors claimed would dramatically change the way oil moves
across and is processed in our country — is that they would be confined to four
existing fenced and graveled sites.
And yet, in a petition that was organized by intervenor Environmental De-
fence, over a hundred people agreed: 
I am also concerned that the project will lead to an increase in the amount of
tar sands oil used in Ontario, which creates more greenhouse gas emissions
than conventional oil and creates more air and water pollution when
refined.125
More pointedly, the Affidavit of Chief Chris Plain of Aamjiwnaang First Na-
tion, filed before the NEB, stated: 
We are also concerned that reversing the flow may change the type of oil
that is currently being provided to oil refineries and other industrial opera-
tors in and around the Sarnia area. In particular, we are concerned that more
medium and heavy crude oils from western Canada will be stored and
processed at the facilities, which may increase the amount of air pollution
and toxic air contaminants that are emitted, released or discharged from the
121 Tim Groves, Piping tar sands oil through Ontario protested, National Energy Boards
hearing on Enbridge pipeline reversal shut down, Toronto Media Co-op, May 23, 2012,
online: <http://toronto.mediacoop.ca/story/piping-tar-sands-oil-through-ontario-
protested/11014>.
122 Appendix I to National Energy Board (NEB) Letter Decision OH-005-2011, Environ-
mental Assessment Report, Pursuant to the National Energy Board Act, Line 9 Rever-
sal Phase I Project (EA Report Summary).
123 Ibid. at 6.
124 Ibid. at 10.
125 Environmental Defence, Signed Petition for Line 9 Reversal Phase I Project (2011).
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facilities into the airshed.126
Chief Plain’s concern was based on Enbridge’s own response to an informa-
tion request that Aamjiwnaang First Nation filed as part of the hearing procedure.
Enbridge stated that “the total supply of heavy crude oil from western Canada will
increase from 1,504,000 to 3,094,000 [barrels per day] from 2011 to 2021”.127 The
Aamjiwnaang First Nation submitted that the Project would cause direct and cumu-
lative impacts on its members by delivering different crude types to local refineries
and industrial operators.
The Board nevertheless decided that “[s]everal submissions described issues
and concerns that were not relevant to the Board’s overall assessment of the ap-
plied-for Project or to this EA, as scoped”, and held as follows: 
Beyond the change in flow direction and operating pressures, Project opera-
tion would effectively remain unchanged from what Line 9 is currently au-
thorized for. No new continuous operational air emissions sources are pro-
posed. Any required pumping at [Sarnia] would be electrically-driven.
Although trace amounts of fugitive GHG emissions can be expected to es-
cape from valves and fittings during pipeline operation, their amounts could
potentially decrease compared to past pipeline operations as a result of re-
placing older valves with newer ones.128
Sarnia already shoulders a burden of at least 5 million kilograms of toxic air
emissions every year, “more than the NPRI releases from the entire provinces of
Manitoba, New Brunswick or Saskatchewan and greater than any other community
in Ontario”.129 The predicted effect of this project is to add significantly to that
pollution load, and yet, the NEB’s ruling on the scope — and specifically its refusal
to address what it calls “upstream and downstream” effects — means that its role is
reduced to tallying up the emissions from a few valves and fittings.130
The Board essentially treated this project as if it was an application to ap-
prove, or at most upgrade, an existing pipeline. The broader implications of the
reversed flow were not allowed to seep in. The Board did consider reversed flow
conditions in terms of their significance for pipeline integrity, which is important,
but it did so only in the form of “contingency planning for accidents and malfunc-
tions during operations”.131 The NEB panel took the view that, “[a]s Line 9 already
126 Affidavit of Chris Plain, Evidence of Aamjiwnaang First Nation, at 22.
127 Exhibit “G”, Enbridge’s response to NEB Information Request #1, October 21, 2011.
128 EA Report Summary, supra note 6 at 12.
129 See the figures in Macdonald and Rang, supra note 91. In 2005, it was 5.7 M (at 5).
130 As Ecojustice counsel Albert Koehl stated in oral argument, the failure to allow discus-
sion of “the issues that are really before the Board and that are entailed by this Applica-
tion . . . diminishes the trust and respect for this public process and it diminishes the
potential respect and legitimacy of any National Energy Board decision to grant an
exemption in this case”. National Energy Board, Hearing Order OH-005-2011, En-
bridge Pipelines Inc (Enbridge), Line 9 Reversal Phase I Project, Application under s.
58 of the National Energy Board Act (NEB Act), Volume 2, London, Ontario, May 24,
2012 (in particular paras 680–688 and 722–727.
131 National Energy Board, Draft Environmental Screening Report: Line 9 Reversal Phase
I Project (2012) at 4.
104   JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND PRACTICE [25 J.E.L.P.]
exists as a buried pipeline, its potential impacts on bio-physical and socio-eco-
nomic elements are limited to those resulting from operational activities (e.g., in-
vestigative digs) or accidents and malfunctions, the locations of which, if any, can-
not be meaningfully predicted”.132
With respect to the broader implications embedded in the application, the
Board explained that it would only consider “upstream Alberta oil sands produc-
tion” in its cumulative effects assessment to the extent that “these activities may
interact with the potential “residual effects” of the Project” (those effects expected
even after the applicant implements “mitigation”). In other words, the Board de-
clined to assess the extent to which this application’s “environmental effects” may
be felt elsewhere — in the form of increased GHG emissions derived from expan-
sion of tar sands production, for example. In the bloodless, techno-language of the
Board’s ruling: “the Project and oil sands production are sufficiently geographi-
cally separated such that there would be no interactions between the residual envi-
ronmental effects of the two”.133
In response to the “downstream” concerns raised by Aamjiwnaang First Na-
tion with respect to cumulative effects associated with increasing toxic air emis-
sions in their airshed, the Board indicated that it would not consider the “down-
stream consumption of oil transported by this segment of Line 9 within the
cumulative effects assessment” because: 
[r]efining destinations are not likely to change as a result of the Project and
the downstream use of refined oil would not be any more identifiable than it
is today. The potential for effects of downstream use to act cumulatively
with any potential effects of the Project is too speculative to merit
consideration.134
The refining destinations may not be expected to change, but the “feedstock”
processed there is expected to change. This evidence was before the Board. The
Aamjiwnaang First Nation did speculate — it noted its worry that the change in
feedstock would have implications for air quality in and around Sarnia. Those im-
plications should have been assessed. But with the scope of the Project restricted to
those four gravelled and fenced sites, and with the extra emissions in Sarnia not
counted as cumulative to the emissions from those four sites, then the downstream
effects could not be considered as part of the Board’s assessment.
Ultimately, the mandate of the NEB in this case was to consider whether the
proposed project was in the Canadian public interest, which it took to include an
assessment of the predicted environmental effects. The Board’s decision indicates
that it was satisfied that “it is in the public interest to approve the Project”.135
Ecojustice, having failed to block the application, nevertheless is of the view that
the Board’s decision contains one “small victory”: the ruling requires Enbridge to
file an additional application if it wants to ship tar sands crude through the reversed
portion of Line 9. The approval granted only applies to light and medium
132 Ibid. at 5.
133 EA Report Summary, supra note 166 at 23.
134 Ibid.
135 Decision Letter.
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crudes,136 meaning that people in Ontario may be provided with the opportunity for
another public hearing if Enbridge decides to move tar sands crude from Sarnia to
Hamilton — an approval, according to Ecojustice counsel Albert Koehl, that is
“normally given quietly behind the scenes”.137 But while this may constitute a
small victory for people living in eastern Canada, it cannot be any consolation to
residents of Sarnia and the Aamiwnaang First Nation. Bitumen will not be ap-
proved to travel further east without another approval, but in terms of air emissions
in Sarnia, Phase I is enough to cut off the supply of light crudes: the toxic air
emissions will now begin to rise as the proportion of tar sands crudes in the pipe-
lines flowing from the west increases. This would have been true even without the
reversal in place, of course, but the Line 9 plan is likely to exacerbate and expedite
the problem for Aamjiwnaang.
(b) Unimagining by Prior Rhetorical De-legitimation
On 6 July 2012, the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act was repealed
and replaced with a new one, applicable to a narrower class of projects.138 If filed
today, the Phase I application would not be subject to the provisions of the new
Act. In fact, the newly introduced changes to the federal environmental assessment
regime seem to be designed to limit public participation in exactly the type of sce-
nario that confronted the NEB on the reversal application — in which participants
seek to bring in “upstream” impacts of pipeline development.139 In contrast to the
prior system, participants will now have to show that they are “directly affected” by
the project proposal,140 and only factors “directly” related to the project will be
considered in the review.141 This is a measure taken purposefully by the federal
government to construct categories of legitimate, and thus illegitimate, participa-
tion, with the effect of unimagining communities bringing forward claims that can-
not mesh with the desired narrative of national development.
The federal cabinet took extraordinary steps over the winter and spring of
2012 to dismiss and discredit legitimate forms of public participation and protest
whenever taken in opposition to a pipeline (or, more broadly, its own “responsible
resource extraction” vision).142 In particular, Minister Oliver’s rhetoric around
136 The decision-letter states: if Enbridge wishes to transport heavy crude oil on Line 9, it
will need to apply to the Board for this change under Part IV of the NEB Act” at 27.
137 Albert Koehl, “It’s all connected: Pipelines, oilsands, environmental rollbacks and
global warming,” September 5, 2012: <http://www.ecojustice.ca/blog/its-all-con-
nected-pipelines-oilsands-environmental-rollbacks-and-global-warming>.
138 Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012, supra note 8.
139 Ecojustice & West Coast Environmental Law, What Bill C-38 means for the environ-
ment (2012).
140 National Energy Board Act, RSC 1985, c N-7, s. 55.2 as amended by Jobs, Growth and
Long-Term Prosperity Act, SC 2012, c. 19, s. 83.
141 Ibid., s. 58.16(2) as amended by s. 85(1).
142 Natural Resources Canada, “Harper Government Announces Plan for Responsible Re-
source Development”, (17 April 2012), online: NRCan <http://www.nrcan.gc.ca>. The
Canadian Press, “Rebranding part of push to streamline environmental reviews”, (28
May 2012), online: CBC News <http://www.cbc.ca>.
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“foreign radicals” influencing the Northern Gateway hearings just as those hearings
opened in British Columbia and before any of the several hundred registered par-
ticipants made their statements and submissions, must be seen as an attempt to
deem those submissions “socially-deviant and harmful”.143 Indigenous activists in
particular, are targeted as radicals by this rhetoric, with the intended effect of sup-
pressing resistance and securing “social peace” through pacification.144 The rheto-
ric constructed a frame in which the submissions of affected communities to the
NEB on the Enbridge application for the Line 9 Reversal were discredited in ad-
vance.145 Residents of affected communities were physically excluded, their con-
cerns were erased, and as a result, their communities remain unimagined in our
national energy debate.
Scaling back outwards to the wider pipeline debates across the country, and
the various proposals on the table, we can find further examples of the process of
active unimagining. Consider the speed and vigour with which the proposals for
First Nation ownership stakes in the new upgrader projects in Alberta were re-
jected.146 A proposal by the Alberta First Nations Energy Center for a $6.6 billion
dollar upgrading facility had the support of Eric Newell, former CEO of Syncrude,
who saw the opportunity as a chance to “bring first nations people to the table as a
full partner in resource development”.147 But Alberta’s Conservative government
pulled out of the deal, saying the potential “double-dividend” from linking oil sands
development with the economic prosperity of first nations was “too risky” for Al-
berta taxpayers.148
What this makes clear is that the communities downstream of the tar sands
expansion are expected to bear the costs of those projects, even as they are actively
denied any of the benefits that might flow from them. This is in no way to suggest
that indigenous opposition to tar sands expansion or pipelines would evaporate
should those benefits materialize, it is simply to reveal how narrowly the idea of
“national development” is construed.149 It is to demonstrate how easily communi-
143 Phillippe Le Billon and Angela Carter, “Securing Alberta’s Tar Sands: Resistance and
Criminalization on a New Energy Frontier,” in Matthew Schnurr and Larry Swatuk,
Natural Resources and Social Conflict: Towards Critical Environmental Security, Pal-
grave MacMillan, 2012, 170–192 at 171).
144 Zalik, supra note 12 at 277.
145 As Le Billon and Carter argue, in casting attention on actors, rather than issues, the
government’s rhetoric de-legitimates environmental causes more generally (supra note
188 at 180).
146 Carrie Tait, “Alberta rejects first nations refinery as too risky”, (18 March 2012), on-
line: The Globe and Mail <http://www.theglobeandmail.com>.
147 Ibid.
148 Ibid.
149 As Gordon Christie noted at the symposium of the papers for this volume, this is in fact
very unlikely. Further, as he noted, the positions of First Nations “are not reducible to
environmental virtue” or “environmental sell-out”. First Nations are often internally
divided. Bands that have signed agreements to secure employment with, or supply
products to the tar sands producers, such as the Athabasca Chipewyan First Nation and
the Fort McKay First Nation, often mention that, while they recognize the environmen-
tal costs of the developments, they have been left with no other viable options for sur-
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ties can be evacuated from both place and time as they are “uncoupled from the
idea of a national future and a national memory”.150 Even though their relationship
with the land is historically deep, those histories must be purged from our national
memory so as to allow the claims of indigenous communities to a sovereign right to
decide matters directly affecting their territories to be overcome in the “national
interest”.151
4. CONCLUSION
The Harper government’s approach to “responsible resource development” fo-
cuses almost exclusively on jobs and growth.152 It emphasizes the widespread be-
nefits of continued tar sands expansion — not just to Alberta, but across the coun-
try.153 Outside of the economic debates, the distributional question — the issue of
vival, with hunting, trapping and fishing rendered impossible (Doug Struck, Canada
Pays Environmentally for U.S. Thirst for Oil, Seattle Times, June 2, 2006). Others in
the region have rejected the idea of development at any cost. But even after signing a
deal, leaders of the Fort McKay First Nation continue to advocate for better environ-
mental outcomes (Diane Meili, Oilsands boom creates uneasy wealth in North, Alberta
Sweetgrass, May 2007). See also Arno Kopecky, noting the “conundrum for native
people around Fort McMurray: Most of them work for the oil sands, even as they com-
plain about the impacts. To some people, that’s hypocrisy. To [others], it simply con-
firms their role as economic hostages” (Kopecky, “The Age of Extreme Oil”, The
Globe and Mail, May 18, 2012). Anna Zalik, supra, conceives of the attempts to secure
the “buy-in” of aboriginal bands in northern Alberta through the mechanism of direct
contracting to be just one of a number of consent strategies employed in a project of
pacification paving the way to a “social license to operate” in the tar sands (at 273).
150 I am relying on the trope of national future and memory embedded in Nixon’s idea of
“unimagining”, supra note 1 at 151.
151 There is a striking parallel to the story told by geographer Anna Stanley about the way
the narrative of federal agencies with respect to nuclear fuel waste gains primacy over
the knowledge and claims of the Serpent River First Nation in Ontario. As Stanley
explains, when the experiences of Aboriginal peoples disrupt the national interest
claim, in this case the idea that all Canadians have benefitted from the use of nuclear
fuel, they must be excluded in order to maintain a coherent narrative of development
(Stanley, “Citizenship and the production of landscape and knowledge in contemporary
Canadian nuclear fuel waste management” (2008) 52(1) The Canadian Geographer
64–82.
152 Natural Resources Canada, “Harper Government Announces Plan for Responsible Re-
source Development”, (17 April 2012), online: NRCan <http://www.nrcan.gc.ca>.
153 McCarthy, supra note 3; McCarthy & Case, supra note 7; Shawn McCarthy, “Ottawa
elbows regulators in quest for final word on pipeline approvals”, (17 April 2012), on-
line: The Globe and Mail <http://www.theglobeandmail.com>. Last winter, Alberta’s
premier Alison Redford and Ontario’s Dalton McGuinty engaged in a high profile spat
over the extent to which Ontario manufacturing benefits from the tar sands, with
McGuinty charging that Canada’s oil sands-fuelled “petro-dollar” was hurting the com-
petiveness of Ontario exporters (Karen Howlett, Dawn Walton & Shawn McCarthy,
“McGuinty-Redford war of words keeps simmering”, (29 February 2012), online: The
Globe and Mail <http://www.theglobeandmail.com>.) The NDP’s Thomas Mulcair re-
opened the can of worms a month later, charging that Canada is succumbing to “Dutch
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the sharing of the costs and benefits — is less obvious. The main opponents of tar
sands expansion talk primarily about the risks of oil spills, and the expected in-
creases in greenhouse gas emissions contributing to climate change.154 According
to this view, the tar sands constitute “dirty oil” because of the tailings ponds, the
unbelievable scale of the landscape change and water use, but chiefly, because of
climate change.
Increasingly, however, indigenous voices are bringing the environmental jus-
tice implications into the debate.155 In Canada, where the reserves, treaty lands and
unceded territories of indigenous communities contain much of the fossil fuel
wealth caught up in the national energy debates,156 those voices have resonance
because they open up possibilities for a new brand of resistance.157 As Gordon
Christie demonstrates (this volume), a coalition of native communities from north-
ern B.C., the Yinka Dene Alliance, have come out as unequivocally opposed to the
Northern Gateway proposal. They are basing their opposition on indigenous law, a
distinct form of legal and political authority, which means, in Christie’s assess-
ment, that their opposition constitutes a formidable challenge to the government’s
narrow vision based on raw exports of bitumen by pipeline and tanker. In fact,
there are a “wide variety of indigenous legal orders, which do not receive the rec-
ognition they deserve nationally or internationally, while having to deal with the
compounding challenges of European settlement, assimilation, and displace-
ment”.158 As the “situating” of Sarnia demonstrates, in these “existing and poten-
tial conflict zones of mixed international, federal and provincial jurisdictions, in-
digenous laws and legal traditions emerge as important touchstones”.159 In
particular, according to John Borrows, indigenous laws “embody precepts and
practices that connect Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Canadians to land in a way
that is not always possible under the current administration of the common or civil
disease”, an affliction of oil-exporting nations. The theory is that the raw exports in-
flate the currency, making exported manufactured goods less competitive (Allan, supra
note 46 at 22–24). According to journalist Andrew Nikiforuk, one of the first to tie the
tar sands to the phenomenon of Dutch disease, “the more Canada relies on bitumen as a
trading staple, the less diverse our economy will become” (Nikiforuk, supra note 33).
154 Swift et al, supra note 51 at 3; Woynillowicz, supra note 35.
155 Jenny Yuen, “Pipeline protesters arrive in Toronto to rally outside Enbridge meeting”,
(8 May 2012), online: Toronto Sun <http://www.torontosun.com>.
156 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of Indigenous peoples, James Anaya,
Extractive industries operating within or near Indigenous territories A/HRC/18/35 (11
July 2011).
157 For an interesting discussion of the way the “the natural environment shapes political
and developmental trajectories”, including the construction of sovereignty, see Usha
Natarajan, TWAIL and the Environment: The State of Nature, the Nature of the State,
and the Arab Spring (2012) 14 Oregon Review of International Law 101.
158 Amar Bhatia, The South of the North: Building on Critical Approaches to International
Law with Lessons from the Fourth World (forthcoming) 14 Oregon Review of Interna-
tional Law, at 104 (citing John Borrows).
159 Ibid. at 120.
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law”.160
This was brought powerfully to the forefront by the Haudensaunee activists
who disrupted the NEB hearings into the Line 9 Reversal application. Using the
“people’s mic” technique, members of local Six Nations communities claimed a
right to free, prior and informed consent and declared that: “the people believe the
NEB hearings are illegitimate, inaccessible and undemocratic”.161 They announced
the “end of the official hearing” as members of the Board and lawyers for Enbridge
left the room (through the same back door), and commenced the “People’s Hear-
ing”.162 The NEB resumed the “official” hearing later in the day, with the protests
continuing outside, and the applause following the speeches of Haudenosaunee op-
posed to the pipeline reversal plan audible even in the text of the official hearing
transcript.163 The voices of the Haudenosaunee clearly influenced how the hearing
proceeded, but they were not heard, and they were wholly disappeared in the
Board’s ruling.164 What the NEB’s decision on the Line 9 Reversal application
provides is a potent example of the “myriad forces arrayed at every level against
the continued assertions of indigenous peoples to determine their own lives and
secure their own distinct futures as free as possible from outside coercion”.165
In terms of communities “downstream” of the tar sands, we hear occasionally
about the case of Fort Chipewyan and the Mikisew Cree First Nation, an aboriginal
band downstream of the tar sands along the Athabasca River — site of the con-
tested cancer cluster that resulted in the unfair discrediting of a concerned family
physician.166 We also hear about the scale of destruction of natural habitats,
brought to the nation’s attention largely through the determination of scientists like
David Schindler.167 I mention these downstream impacts not to undermine them,
nor to over-state the attention they have received. The point is simply to note that to
the limited extent that “downstream” communities do factor into the national en-
160 John Borrows, Indigenous Legal Traditions (2005) 19 Journal of Law and Policy 167-
223 at 196.
161 Quotes taken from You Tube video posted by Mike Roy, Occupy and Activist mic
check Enbridge pipeline hearing May 23 London “The Indignants”, online:
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k6Kflcbgh5A>.
162 Ibid.
163 Hearing Order OH-005-2011, Enbridge Pipelines Inc. (Enbridge), Line 9 Reversal
Phase I Project, Application under s. 58 of the National Energy Board Act (NEB Act),
Volume 2, Hearing held at London, Ontario, May 24, 2012, see paras 80–85.
164 There are parallels to Bhatia’s re-counting of the “magic tricks” (106) and “acts of
disappearance” (114) perpetrated against the Haudenosaunee by law and the early Ca-
nadian state, as well as the resistance to them.
165 Bhatia, supra note 158 at 143.
166 Josh Wingrove, “Oil-sands report criticizes all stakeholders”, (15 December 2010), on-
line: The Globe and Mail <http://www.theglobeandmail.com>; Elizabeth Withey,
“‘Just do the right thing by Fort Chip’: physician”, (9 March 2009), online: Edmonton
Journal <http://www2.canada.com>.
167 Schindler brought the issue to the nation’s attention in 2010, and has been credited with
instigating much of the reform that has taken place. Josh Wingrove, “Elevated levels of
toxins found in Athabasca River”, (30 August 2010), online: The Globe and Mail
<http://www.theglobeandmail.com>.
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ergy debate, we tend to hear about those downstream of the extractive sites, not
those downstream of the refining.
Almost never does the Aamjiwnaang First Nation factor in.168 Nor, for that
matter, do the already over-burdened, mostly black communities on the fencelines
of the refineries in Port Arthur, Texas, on the U.S. gulf coast,169 or the communi-
ties in Asia that will be downstream of the refineries expected to pop up to deal
with our dirty exports of raw crude and bitumen.170 The mainstream debate does
not include discussion of the pollution associated with the refining of bitumen and
its derivatives, because those communities affected do not stand to benefit from tar
sands expansion.171 Including those communities in the debate would derail the
myth of uniform national ascent — the clean upward trajectory implied by the na-
tional interest claim. And thus, they must be actively unimagined. If they were al-
lowed into view, we would clearly see the distributional consequences — the envi-
ronmental justice implications — of the crucial infrastructure decisions we are
faced with. The seemingly bright future facing the nation with a coast-to-coast
pipeline, in which everyone is a winner,172 requires this unimagining.
It is not just economic value that will drain out of the pipes that empty into the
U.S. gulf, the B.C. ports, or the eastern economies; it is also pollution.173 That
168 Activists from the Aamjiwnaang First Nation have begun establish ties with west coast
First Nations, however, so this may be starting to change. Ron Plain, an activist from
Aamjiwnaang First Nation, attended the Enbridge AGM in Toronto on May 9, 2012
and invited CEO Patrick Daniel to visit Aamjiwnaang to witness the impacts himself
(http://www.enbridge.com/~/media/www/Site%20Documents/Investor%20Relations/
2012/ENB_2012_PrelimTranscript-2012-05-09T17_30.ashx). See also Dayna Nadine
Scott and Adrian Smith, “A new ‘climate justice’ alliance is being forged between First
Nations youth downstream from Sarnia’s Chemical Valley and Alberta’s Tar Sands.
Indigenous Youth Make the Connection” (2012) 46 Canadian Dimension; and Dayna
Nadine Scott, “Canada Needs a National Energy Strategy”, Opinion, The Hill Times,
June 25, 2012, 15. Finally, Vanessa Gray, a founder of the Green Teens of Aamjiwn-
aang has joined the speaking tour, “She Speaks: Indigenous Women Speak Out Against
Tar Sands” travelling across the country over the fall of 2012 (Daniel Punch, “Environ-
mental activist speaking up”, Sarnia Observer, October 2, 2012,
<http://www.theobserver.ca/2012/10/02/environmental-activist-speaking-up>.
169 Ronald L Braithwaite, Sandra E Taylor & Henrie M Treadwell, Health Issues in the
Black Community (John Wiley and Sons, 2009) at 189; for a more in-depth look at Port
Arthur, desired end-point for the proposed Keystone XL pipeline, see Steve Lerner,
“Port Arthur, Texas: Public Housing Residents Breathe Contaminated Air from Nearby
Refineries and Chemical Plants” in Sacrifice zones: the front lines of toxic chemical
exposure in the United States (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2010) 73.
170 CBC News, supra note 56.
171 Even workers in the oil patch, though, see a need to ease off the rapid pace of tar sands
development with the aim of curbing greenhouse gas emissions. Joel Harden & Govind
Rao, Energy Sector Collective Bargaining Research Report (Communications, Energy
and Paperworkers Union of Canada, 2012).
172 McKenna, supra note 27.
173 The graphic accompanying Eric Reguly’s essay bemoaning the “exporting” of jobs as-
sociated with the Keystone XL depicts a big pipe with money signs flowing out the
bottom into the U.S. gulf, supra note 72.
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pollution harms not just individual health, but it erodes family ties and community
relationships; it creates community-wide stress that debilitates neighborhoods —
emotionally, culturally, economically174 — and politically.175 The extraction and
upgrading of bitumen in Alberta, the transfer of crude oil by pipe, and its subse-
quent transformation through the application of technology and the addition of
human labour in Sarnia, Ontario, occurs under certain market conditions and capi-
talist relations of production. In interrogating systemic questions of power and
ownership relating to who profits from and exerts exploitative control over ecologi-
cal resources, economic capital and social labour, an aim has also been to take
account of how these exploitative relations shape everyday physical realities on the
ground in a particular place.
It is important to keep in mind Harvey’s notion of the “spatial fix”: pipelines
are enduring. It is not just a matter of the retrenchment of the infrastructure of
“fossil capitalism”,176 which is troubling, but the fact that the routes we decide
upon bring long-term consequences for the places and spaces they flow into. They
have the potential to dramatically recontour the economies, environments and polit-
ics of those communities. In this paper, I undertake the task of situating Sarnia and
trying to bring the Aamjiwnaang First Nation — as a community downstream of
the tar sands — back into our national imagination. There is much more work to be
done. To comprehend fully the distributive consequences of the pipeline decisions
we are currently contemplating, we need to reveal and resist the active unimagining
of downstream communities in the new national energy debates. 
174 Robert Verchick, “In a Greener Voice: Feminist Theory and Environmental Justice”
(1996) 19:23 Harv Women’s LJ at 84.
175 Mitchell, supra note 17.
176 Elmar Altvater, “The Social and Natural Environment of Fossil Capitalism” (2007) 43
Socialist Register 37–59.
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